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The Case of Microfinancial Services
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This paper argues that the level of financial services provision determines the risk 
management strategies among the poor. The paper estimates the determinants of the 
household’s use of one, two or all three types of microfinancial services applying ordered 
probit models and additionally probit models for combinations of them. By doing this on 
household survey data from Sri Lanka, there is empirical evidence that household’s 
probability to participate in microfinancial services increases with rising self perception 
towards risk. Further, we find that it depends highly on the type of risk, if a household is more 
or less likely to use microfinancial services in Sri Lanka, whereas the accessibility to one, two 
or three microfinancial services is determined by the experience of specific hazards in the 
past. The study finds that the poor are less likely to use microfinancial services than their 
better off counterparts. 
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1   Introduction 
In many developing countries, less than half of the population has access to the formal 
financial markets (World Bank 2008). The lacking access to finance for the majority of 
population around the world is seen by recent development theorists as a critical instrument for 
generating persistent income inequality, as well as indicating slower economic growth. The type 
of risks faced by the poor such as that of death, illness, injury and accident, are no different from 
those faced by the better off, but the poor are indeed more exposed to such risks that can 
severely affect their livelihoods due to their economic status, income and earning abilities 
(Holzmann and Joergensen 2000, Siegel et al. 2001). At two stages, a household can cope with 
risk, ex ante before a hazard appears to the household or ex post after the occurrence of such 
shock (Morduch 1995, Morduch 1999, Townsend 1995, Dercon 2002).  
In the past financial services were not considered to be an option for low-income groups 
as an ex ante risk management strategy, as they were seen too poor to afford the costs of 
financial services such as insurance premiums. Further, they do not seem applicable for formally 
provided financial services and especially as well as uninsurable to the wide variety of risks they 
face. Available evidence for developing countries states that households are mostly only partially 
and not fully insured against income shocks (Morduch 1995, Townsend 1995, Lim and 
Townsend 1998), so that shocks to household’s income such as death of a household member, 
lead to consumption movements that are not perfectly insurable, and thus may induce famine or 
death. In such a case financial services can function as risk management strategies serving means 
to cope with the consequences of a shock and offering savings and insurance products for 
consumption smoothing as ex ante risk management strategies (Zeller 2001). The availability of 
sufficient and efficient risk management strategies are widely seen as an important integral to any 
poverty reduction strategy.  
Microfinance may be a way to combat poverty and to develop the institutional capacities 
of financial systems providing efficiently at first only loans to poor households. In recent years 
the microfinance movement has become more and more demand-oriented and diversified 
introducing new product lines, such as savings and insurance products, to low-income groups in 
developing countries (Zeller and Sharma 2002, Armendáriz and Morduch 2005). Henceforward, a 
more holistic concept of microfinance is realised not only by microfinance practitioners, but as 
well among academic circles (Zeller and Sharma 2002, Armendáriz and Morduch 2005). Several 
contributions exists so far in the literature on the determinants of households’ use of financial 
services of the microfinance sector in developing countries emphasizing one of the financial 
services, primarily loans,  followed by savings and insurance (Muradoglu and Taskin 1996, Jabbar 3 
et al. 2002, Pal 2002, Asfaw 2003, Jütting 2003, Bhat and Jain 2006, Gine et al. 2008, Swain 2007, 
Barslund and Tarp 2008). To our knowledge, Bendig et al. 2009 are the first that assume that 
households’ decision for loans, savings products and insurances are highly interconnected and 
depend on one another for specific causes. Considering this, we capture the diversification of 
microfinancial service participation of low-income households by estimating the determinants of 
the usage of no, one, or more than one microfinancial service. By doing so, we emphasize the 
impact of household’s experienced risk exposure as a determinant of household’s usage of 
microfinancial services, which can be used as possible risk management strategies. Further, we 
assume the more diversified use of microfinancial services in number, such as one, two or all 
three services, and as well in quality relating to the complexity
1 of the financial services gives an 
indication of household’s level of financial capability.  
Therefore, we first attempt to estimate the determinants, which affect the household’s 
decision to participate in no, only one, two or all three different types of microfinancial services 
using an ordered probit model. In addition, we calculate probit models on specific combinations 
of financial services. We focus in particular on the household’s self risk assessment and the 
exposure to different types of severe hazards experienced by the household in the past five years. 
Thereby, the estimation of an ordered probit model may add additional value by investigating the 
kind of factors that a household uses more than one financial service and if a higher risk 
exposure in the past determines the household’s decision to diversify and extend the usage of 
microfinancial services. From this, we attempt to derive which role such services can play in 
terms of risk mitigation in Sri Lanka.  Further, we aim to answer the following questions: (i) What 
determines the usage of microfinancial services such as loans, savings products, and insurance, 
offered by microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka? (ii) Who are the households who use these 
services in Sri Lanka? (iii) Who are the households who use more than one service and who are 
the households who use no or only one service, i.e. who are the more and who are the less 
financial capable households?  
A comprehensive survey of 330 households conducted in May to July 2008 in Sri Lanka is 
used in the analysis. Hereby, we focus on the use of financial services, which is determined by the 
demand and the supply of financial services (World Bank, 2008: 28). By analyzing the usage of 
microfinancial services, we do not estimate the determinants of demand for microfinancial 
services, but the determinants of their actual use. This is a mixture of and interrelation between 
the demand for and supply of financial services in Sri Lanka. Only the households who have 
                                                 
1 I.e. insurance is widely seen as more complex and so harder to understand than savings products or credits, especially by the 
poor. 4 
access to the financial service market can use financial services, so that we implicitly include 
access into our estimation of the usage of such services
2. 
 The outline of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 presents the 
conceptual framework of the study. Section 3 discusses the determinants of the uptake of 
financial services in developing countries. Section 4 describes the methodologies, including data 
set, the summary statistics and the estimation methods. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Conceptual  Framework 
The paper argues that financial services function as important risk management and/or 
risk mitigation strategies, while insurance and savings products are ex ante, i.e. preventive, 
strategies for consumption smoothing, credit is typically used as an ex post risk management 
strategy. However, household’s decision for loans, savings products and insurances are highly 
interconnected and depend on one another for specific causes, as users of a financial service have 
an information advantage due to their membership in a financial institution and a higher level of 
financial literacy due to their usage of such services than their non-users counterpart (Bendig et 
al. 2009). Therefore, microfinancial service participation of low-income households, i.e. the usage 
of  no service, one, two or all three types of microfinancial services gives an indication of the 
diversification of household’s financial behavior and respectively the risk management strategies 
in use.  
  The study framework structures the relationship between household’s participation in 
financial services and their level of financial capability, and household’s abilities to use these as 
risk management strategies and their vulnerability
3. Covering a wide range of savings, credit and 
insurance products, financial services are strategies to address specific financial needs of a 
household. These services can be provided formally or informally. The participation in financial 
services is as well determined by household’s financial capability level, which are knowledge, 
skills, experiences and attitudes which make a household more or less capable to manage its 
money, prepare for risks, plan ahead and respectively use financial services. Financial capability, 
or financial literacy as it was initially conceived, is a combination of three interrelated elements, 
i.e. the knowledge, skills and attitudes that make a household capable to manage its finances 
                                                 
2 Users of financial services can be distinguished from nonusers. Among the nonusers are those who are excluded by themselves 
from the use of financial services voluntarily, such as households who do not use financial services due to cultural or religious 
reasons, and households who do not need or want to use financial services. The other group are the involuntarily excluded 
households who demand financial services, but do not have access to them in respect to insufficient income or lending risk, 
discrimination due to social, religious, or ethnic grounds, contractual and informational framework, and too high prices or 
inappropriate product features offered by the providers (World Bank, 2008: 29). 
3 Vulnerability is defined here as household’s risk exposure and their ability to manage such risks, the related consequences, and 
the microfinancial services participation as measures for managing shocks (Cohen and Sebstad 2003, Matul 2009). 5 
(PFRC 2005, Matul 2009). Financial capability is a relative, not an absolute concept. It may be 
possible to define a basic level of financial capability, that is required by everyone in a given 
society. Beyond, the degree and nature of financial capability required by any given individual will 
be determined by their financial circumstances (PFRC 2005). The knowledge is acquired by 
experience, education and training; and passively through information from different other 
sources, e.g. family and friends, media, information meetings organized by or brochures from the 
microfinance institutions. The state of knowledge will typically increase through a person’s life 
cycle, but however it can become redundant or inaccurate, if circumstances change. The person’s 
knowledge need to be applicable to manage their money and to make appropriate financial 
decisions. Further, the person must be able to take the necessary steps to apply their knowledge 
and skills, which depends highly on the attitude towards financial capability. They must be willing 
to invest the time and other resources to apply their knowledge and skills, able to gain access to 
information, advice and other resources, and confident enough to exercise their skills and to act 
on the results. 
In behavioral terms
4, our analysis differentiates between more or less financial capable 
households (Matul 2009). A more financial capable household is proactive, has a positive attitude 
towards managing its finance, take longer horizons in financial planning, save systematically, try 
to insure or at least prepare for risks, and borrow in a responsible way. Further, the household 
uses differentiated financial services, i.e. more than one service, as risk management strategies, 
which may lead to higher asset accumulation in the future. A less financial capable household is 
more reactive, do not see much sense in or is not able to manage money, or plan ahead, and 
tends to live from hand to mouth and respond spontaneously to risks. The household uses no or 
less financial services than the more financial capable household. This leads to lower ability to 
respond to risk they may occur in the future and thus to a higher vulnerability of the household. 
We analyze who are the more and who are the less financial capable households, i.e. the 
determining factors of such households. Financial capability is highly related to household’s 
vulnerability (Matul 2009). Siegel et al. (2001) suggest the degree of vulnerability depends on the 
characteristics of the risk and household’s ability to address adequately to the expenditures, which 
are associated with the consequences of such risks
5. Vulnerability can be divided into three steps 
of a risk chain: the incidence of the risk or risky event, the household’s decision to choose which 
type of risk management strategy to respond to the consequences of the peril, and finally what is 
the outcome, i.e. the welfare loss of the household, of the incidence of the risk (Siegel et al. 
                                                 
4 Four different areas of financial capability are identified, which are money management, planning ahead, risk preparation and 
usage of financial services (PFRC 2005). 
5 ‘A household can be vulnerable to future loss of welfare below socially accepted norms caused by risky events.’ (Siegel et al. 
2001: 4) 6 
2001). If the household’s welfare decreases after the experience of the shock, household’s 
vulnerability comes explicitly from risks and as well the respective impact of risks shows the 
degree of household’s vulnerability. 
3  Determinants of the Uptake of Financial Services 
We analyze the household’s participation in financial services, indicating its financial 
capability, as a possibility to manage the risks they are faced by. Therefore, it is important to note 
that in the literature there are several empirical findings on the determinants of the usage of 
financial services in developing countries, which we use to derive predictions to control for in the 
estimations. The literature can be divided into three strands analysing each service of the three 
elements of the finance trinity separately (Bendig et al. 2009). There are considerably more 
studies discussing especially the issue of credit (Kochar 1997, Atieno 1997, Jabbar et al. 2002, 
Nguyen et al. 2002, Pal 2002, Pitt and Khandker 2002, Zeller and Sharma 2002, Swain 2007, 
Barslund and Tarp 2008) than for savings (Gupta 1970, Deaton 1992, Gurgand et al. 1994, 
Muradoglu and Taskin 1996, Spio and Groenwald 1996, Fafchamps et al. 1998, Kimuyu 1999, 
Aryeteey and Udry 2000, Kiiza and Pederson 2002, Hoogeven 2003) or insurance in developing 
countries (Bendig et al. 2009, Asfaw 2003, Cohen et al. 2005, Jütting 2003, Bhat and Jain 2006, 
McCord et al. 2006, Gine et al. 2008, Gine and Yang 2007). None of these studies estimate the 
differences between the determinants of household’s participation in no, one, two or respectively 
three microfinancial services. Nevertheless, all studies consider the impact of different 
determinants, especially several demographic and socioeconomic household characteristics on 
financial service uptake, from which it is possible to derive propositions for the estimations.  
In the literature, female headship is considered to be negatively related to the use of 
financial services (Pitt and Khandker 2002). Household size is widely recognized as an important 
determinant of the use of financial services (Dror et al. 2007, Swain 2007, Barslund Tarp 2008). 
Further, there exist contributions that find a negative relationship between age and the demand 
for informal credit (Barslund and Tarp 2008) and the demand for insurance (Chankova et al. 
2008, Gine et al. 2008). Bendig et al. (2009) find such a life-cycle effect for loans and insurance. 
Several contributions have found that the household is more likely to take up financial services, 
especially loans (Kiiza and Pederson 2002, Pal 2002, Pitt and Khandker 2002) or contract 
insurance with increasing income or wealth of the household (Jütting 2003, Pauly 2004, Bhat and 
Jain 2006, Dror et al. 2007, Gine et al. 2008). Higher asset endowment and land ownership of a 
household is expected to have a positive effect on the choice of taking up one or more financial 
services, whereas lower income earning ability, either self-employed or not employed, are 
expected to be negatively associated with the use of financial services. If a household receives 7 
remittances, influence the timing of savings within the life-cycle of a household (Spio and 
Groenewald 1996). Remittances increase the likelihood for savings products and decreases it for 
insurance uptake as remittances may function as a insurance substitute (Bendig et al. 2009).  
Education has a statistically significant effect either on credit demand (Jabbar et al. 2002, 
Pitt and Khandker 2002, Swain 2007, Barslund and Tarp 2008), savings (Kiiza and Pederson 
2002) or insurance (Chankova et al. 2008, Gine et al. 2008, McCord 2001). Households may 
differ in their cognitive ability to understand an insurance product and other financial services as 
well as their willingness to experiment with them. In line with the literature, lower levels of 
educational attainment may reduce the probability to use any of the three financial services. The 
positive effect of education is expected to be particularly strong for the use of more than one 
service or for insurance, as this goes along with higher sophistication of the demand for financial 
services and a better understanding of such complex engagements.   
In developing countries, the uptake of a loan play a significant role for the risk 
management of a household, as several households use credits not to start a new business 
activity, but to obtain additional working capital or to restart a business after the experience of a 
shock (Zeller and Sharma 2002, Nguyen et al. 2002). Further, there exists a positive relation 
between the household’s past exposure of shocks and the usage of microfinancial services 
differing for the tested risks such as death, illness, or other risks (Bendig et al. 2009). Therefore,  
we propose that households with a higher exposure to risks have a higher probability to use 
loans, and a lower probability to use savings and insurance ex post of a shock. Further, we expect 
a manifold picture related to the type of risks, as the usage of microfinancial services depends 
highly on the type of risk (Bendig et al. 2009). Further, Gine et al. (2008) find that risk averse 
low-income households do not have access to insurance. There is evidence that households who 
feel themselves more exposed to risk are less likely to use financial services (Bendig et al. 2009). It 
is plausible to suggest that better-off households have a better ability and willingness to bear a 
given amount of risk compared to relatively poor households, so that the poor are most risk 
averse, as a given loss can be ruinous for the poor, as they are too close to subsistence in 
developing countries (Ray 1999). Therefore, we suggest that the use of financial services by low-
income households increases with the degree of risk aversion in Sri Lanka.  
4 Methodology   
a)  Sources of Data and Summary Statistics 
The analysis of this paper is based on a household survey conducted from May to July in 
2008 in various villages all over Sri Lanka covering all districts and regions. The survey was 8 
undertaken for a research project on the demand for microinsurance among low-income 
households in Sri Lanka with a sample size of 330 households, out of which 240 households have 
bought and 90 have not bought any microinsurance. 209 households have taken up a credit and 
200 contracted any savings product in the past five years 
In Sri Lanka, the study site covered 30 villages in all 14 districts of all regions. Five 
different MFIs, namely Women’s Development Federation, Women’s Development Banking 
Federation, Sanasa Insurance Company, Yasiru Mutual Fund and SEEDS (Sarvodaya Economic 
Enterprises Development Services Ltd) had been identified as the main suppliers of voluntary
6 
microinsurance for low-income households in Sri Lanka. The survey sampling frame is a census 
of households randomly selected from the client bases of the five respective MFIs and allocated 
among the districts in which the MFIs are operating. From each district, two or three of the 
respective MFIs have been chosen except from Vavunia and Batticaloa, which are in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces, where only SEEDS is operating. The selected number of 
households from each district differs from 15 to 50 households. Two or three villages from each 
district and one Community Based Organization (CBO) from each village are randomly picked 
representing the selected MFIs from each district. A total of 30 CBOs are included in the survey 
with 10 to 15 clients each selected randomly from the client base. Half of these clients are insured 
and the other half is non-insured. In the case of Yasiru Mutual Fund all clients are insured, so 
that the non-insured clients were randomly chosen from the non-insured households in the 
villages, in which the insured clients of the Yasiru Mutual fund are located. In total 330 
households were interviewed, including two strata of (micro)insured and non-insured 
households, whereas 240 households use and 90 do not use any insurance, including insurances 
offered by other institutions than the five respective MFIs.  
The survey questionnaire contained detailed sections on demographic and socioeconomic 
household characteristics, household assets, the occurrence of shocks, risk management 
strategies, evaluation of household’s risk self assessment and situation. Special focus is given on 
information about the integration of households in the financial market, i.e. the embedding in 
different financial institutions, and the use of loans, savings products and in particular insurance. 
In the estimations the vector of explanatory
7 variables includes a household’s self perception 
towards risk index as a continuous variable, eight risk exposure dummies, and as control variables 
different household characteristics including demographic and wealth variables, education, 
                                                 
6 The participating institutions provide credit insurances as well, which are compulsory for the uptake of a loan or other financial 
product. Yet, these credit insurances are neglected in this analysis and the respective observations are dropped from the data set. 
7 Table 7 (in the Appendix) shows the definition and specific details of each variable’s construction used as independent variable.  
All analyses were performed in Intercooled Stata 9.0. To test for potential problems of multicollinearity, we computed the 
pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables, for the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables, see Table 9 in 
Appendix. Further, we calculated the variance inflation factors using the collin command in Stata. Except for the regressors “age” 
and “age squared” all VIFs were less than 2.21. Therefore, we see no reason for concern. 9 
economic activities of the household head and the distance to road as an access to market 
indicator and information about remittances. 
In relation to the dependent variable summary statistics for the sample are presented in 
Table 1. The descriptive statistics are presented in relation to the categories of the dependent 
variable used in the estimations of the ordered probit model, namely nonusers of microfinancial 
services, users of one, two or three microfinancial services. 
In order to capture household’s attitude towards risk as a proxy for household’s degree of 
risk aversion, we include a variable which covers household’s self perception towards risk to a 
range of risks
8. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Use of no, one, two or three microfinancial services 









Risk  assessment  0.146 0.309 -0.246  0.066 -0.006  0.114 0.061 0.100 
Drought  0.057 0.041 0.146 0.043 0.109 0.025 0.115 0.027 
Animal  threat  0.026 0.026 0.097 0.039 0.066 0.021 0.087 0.026 
Crop  Failure  0.031 0.031 0.041 0.027 0.051 0.018 0.102 0.029 
Death  -  -  0.044 0.035 0.075 0.025 0.082 0.027 
Illness  0.152 0.077 0.063 0.037 0.121 0.028 0.187 0.037 
Input  0.094 0.444 0.197 0.049 0.095 0.024 0.275 0.044 
No ability to sell 
agricultural products 
-  -  0.080 0.038 0.058 0.021 0.129 0.033 
Other  risk  0.072 0.031 0.055 0.023 0.072 0.023 0.089 0.028 
Female  head  0.146 0.082 0.191 0.049 0.147 0.033 0.155 0.036 
Household  size  3.906 0.228 3.750 0.202 4.034 0.113 4.310 0.135 
Age  50.47 2.345 45.47 1.832 46.88 1.007 48.337  1.096 
Age  squared  2669.1 240.95 2233.3 171.16 2317.2 98.17  2461.9 109.51 
No  or  primary  education  0.272 0.093 0.162 0.049 0.153 0.032 0.188 0.038 
Secondary  Education  0.467 0.107 0.415 0.067 0.376 0.045 0.363 0.046 
Head is selfemployed  0.614  0.106 0.633 0.059 0.571 0.046 0.558 0.048 
Head  is  unemployed  0.272 0.093 0.248 0.063 0.179 0.036 0.241 0.043 
Distance  to  road  721.14 241.11 664.64 149.25 307.86 69.91  180.05 27.89 
Remittance  0.031 0.031 0.072 0.039 0.027 0.014 0.069 0.025 
Land  Ownership  0.516 0.104 0.665 0.060 0.748 0.041 0.895 0.030 
Asset  index  -0.863  0.125 0.053 0.129 -0.069  0.092 0.353 0.088 
Observations 26  67  129  108 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The nonusers of financial services report the highest score of risk assessment, followed 
by the users of three services, the users of two and one services. Related to the risk exposure 
experienced by the household in the past five years, we control for eight different dummy 
variables in our analysis. These variables capture the most severe risks households faced in Sri 
Lanka in the past five years. In self reported rankings from the survey data the households in Sri 
Lanka report war and terrorism (19%) as the most important peril they face in the future; a 
dramatic increase of input prices (18%), serious illness of a working adult household member 
(8%) are cited second and third most frequently, followed by drought (8%). The variable takes 
                                                 
8 The index is constructed from three questions related to the household’s self perception of subjective exposure to health shocks, 
road or work accidents, and economic shocks compared with neighbouring households and one question about household’s own 
rating of willingness to take risks using factor analysis. We cannot take risk aversion into account in our analysis, as suggested by 
the literature on insurance demand, since experimental methods used to measure personal risk aversion were not included in our 
survey and related standardized questions in our survey questionnaire only reflect this in a limited way. 10 
the value of 1 if a household experienced a severe shock during the previous five years and this 
had severe
9 consequences, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables are if a household experienced 
a severe drought, animal threat, crop failure, death of a household member, illness of a household 
member, an increase of input prices, the inability to sell agricultural products, and any other 
severe shock during the last five years. This category captures mostly idiosyncratic shocks, which 
may occur beside the hazards already covered by the other seven risk categories. Beside the 
variables illness of a household member and any other severe shock, a higher share of the users 
of one, two or three financial services report the incidence of severe shock than the nonusers of 
financial services. 
An asset index
10 constructed via factor analysis and a dummy variable for land ownership 
are considered as proxies for the wealth status of a household. Further, we add asset quintile 
dummies in one estimation to investigate the households who use any financial services in 
relation to their wealth status. A higher share of the users of one, two or three financial services 
related to the nonusers of financial services own any land compared to the full sample. The users 
of three financial services have the highest asset endowment, followed by the users of two and 
one financial service. The nonusers present the lowest asset endowment score. The users of 
financial services are generally better off households than the nonusers in the communities 
surveyed. The data set in general, but especially the demographic and wealth data confirms that 
the sample consists of poor and middle-income households. The majority of households is 
engaged in low-income economic activities such as small-scale industrial businesses, petty trading 
and farm activities at the subsistence level. Around 20 percent of household heads have no 
formal or only primary education, whereas 40 percent of households heads report that they 
attained secondary education. Around 60 percent of the household heads are self-employed or 
contractual workers in either agriculture or non-agricultural activities, whereas around 20 percent 
of heads are not employed due to young or old age, disability, or similar reasons. The influence of 
the household size on the usage of financial services depends highly on the composition of the 
households
11. Yet, larger households have here a high number of children and elderly people, but 
as well more economically active adult household members. On average, we find that households 
who use two or three financial services have more members in their households than nonusers of 
financial services. The variable age of household head shows that the users of no financial 
services are significantly older than the users of one, two, or three financial services.  
                                                 
9 Severity is measured in the sense that the household needed more than one month to recover economically from this respective 
shock. 
10 We controlled if any financial services are used to any asset, such as construction loans. These assets are neglected in the asset 
index, by doing so,  we avoid potential problems of endogeneity. Land is generally not an as easily purchasable assets as other 
assets, so the influence of endogeneity can be neglected. 
11 In our data set, household size correlates highly with the number of dependants (correlation coefficient of 0.79) and with the 
number of children (correlation coefficient of 0.49). 11 
b) Estimation  Methods   
The usage of the three alternative formal financial services, such as use of savings 
products, use of loans, and use of insurance, is estimated in the form of an ordered probit model 
on the alternatives whether or not households used no financial services, only one, two or three 
financial services in the previous five years. Financial services, which are defined here as formally 
offered financial services, are services provided by state bank, development bank, domestic 
private bank, foreign private bank, microfinance institution (MFI), insurance company and 
financial leasing company. Formal savings products includes all formal financial services, which 
are voluntarily used for a savings purpose, for instance savings accounts, current accounts or 
savings plans.
12 We control for that by excluding all savings products, which were compulsory or 
bound to any other formal financial service, so that users of formal savings products are only 
those households which aim for using such products for the genuine purpose of saving or safe 
storage of money. Formal loans include all loans taken up voluntarily from the mentioned 
institutions and which are not used for the purchase of any durable assets in the last five years. 
Formal insurance is confined to those types of insurance which are offered by the microfinance 
institutions covered by the survey conducted and may be understood as private suppliers. Hence, 
the category includes mainly health and life insurances, but as well many other types of 
insurances, such as other life cycle events insurance, vehicle insurance, old age annuities/pension, 
credit insurance
13, crop insurance and property insurance, from the respective five different 
microfinance providing institutions in the sample.  
Table 2 and 3 shows that the use for each of these services may be interrelated, as many 
of the households use several of these services simultaneously. Therefore, we first estimate an 
ordered probit model with a categorical dependent variable, which has the value 1 for “no 
financial service”, 2 for “one financial service”, 3 for “two financial services” and 4 for “all three 
financial services” and second the determinants of the use of specific combinations of financial 
services using probit models. The outcomes are here ordered related to the quantity of financial 









                                                 
12 The related question in the survey’s questionnaire only mentioned savings and do not ask or distinguish any specific savings 
products.  
13 Credit insurances are not taken into account in this study, as these insurances are mostly not taken up voluntarily, but bounded 
to any credit or to the allowance of a credit.  12 
Table 2: Use of savings products, loans and/or insurance 
Use of  Number of households in 
the sample 
None   26 
Savings only   23 
Credit only  16 
Insurance only  28 
Savings and credit  133 
Savings and insurance  152 
Credit and insurance  168 
Savings, credit, and insurance  108 
Total 330 
Source: Authors’  illustration 
Table 3: Use of no, only one, two or three financial services 
Use of  Number of households 
in the sample 
None   26 
One financial service  67 
Two financial services  129 
Three financial services  108 
Total 330 
Source: Authors’  illustration 
 
From the first category use of “no financial services” to the latest category use of “all 
three financial services”, not only the quantity, but as well the sophistication and complexity of 
the use of financial services increases gradually. For this type of dependent variable the ordered 
probability model is a suitable tool (Greene 2003). The two alternative model types are the 
ordered logit and the ordered probit model, from which we choose to estimate the ordered 
probit model, whereas the logit specification is only a trivial modification and appears to make 
virtually no difference in practice (Greene 2003). 
The ordered probit model is built around a latent regression in the same manner as the 
binomial probit models and based on the following specification: 
. '
* ε β + = x y  
Where x is the vector of explanatory variables set and ε  is the disturbance term. As usual 
* y  is  
unobserved, but what we do observe is: 
.   if   3   y 
,   if   2   y 
, 0   if   1   y 





















This is a form of censoring. The  s ' µ are unknown parameters to be estimated with β . 
The choice of the respondents follows a decision-making process, which depends on certain 
measurable factors, x, and certain unobservable factors, ε . In the ordered probit model ε  has a 
standard normal distribution. The probability of observing outcome i corresponds to the 13 
probability that the estimated linear function, plus random error, is within the range of the cut-
points estimated the outcome: 
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j µ is assumed to be normally distributed in ordered probit. In either case, one estimates the 
coefficients  k β β β ,..., , 2 1 together with the cut-points  , , , , 3 2 1 0 κ κ κ κ .  0 κ is taken as  ∞ − and 
3 κ is taken as  ∞ + . All of this is a direct generalization of the ordinary two-outcome probit 
model. 
5  Estimation Results and Interpretation  
In Table 4 and 5, we estimate a ordered probit model on the uptake of none, one, two or 
three financial services
14. The categorical dependent variable is 1 if a household does not use any 
financial service, 2 if a household uses one financial service, 3 if a household uses two financial 
services, or 4 if a household uses three financial services
15. In Table 5, we replace in the ordered 
probit regression the explanatory variable “asset index” with five asset quintiles indicating 
household’s relative wealth status rank in terms of asset endowment to investigate if the poor 
have access to financial services or if financial service providers successfully target the poor. In 
comparison, we present for additional value regression estimates of probit models for the use of 
specific combinations of financial services (Table 6)
16.  
We emphasize household’s self risk assessment and exposure to different types of severe 
hazards experienced by the household in the past five years to analyse the kind of factors 
determine that a household uses more than one financial service and if a higher risk exposure in 
the past determines the household’s decision to diversify and extend the usage of financial 
services. From this, we attempt to derive which role such services can play in terms of risk 
mitigation and financial capability in Sri Lanka. In Table 4 we find that households who 
perceived themselves more exposed to risk, are more likely to use one, two or three financial 
                                                 
14 Because of the underlying cross-sectional survey data, we treat cautiously any causality of the estimation outcomes due to the 
inability to control for heterogeneity or potential reverse causal relationships. Further, it is important to note that our findings 
include potential endogeneity problems, as omitted explanatory or third factor variables influences as well the outcomes and 
explanations shown here. 
15 The coefficients are normalized to reflect the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability 
of financial service uptake. We calculated the marginal effects for the ordered probit estimation using the margeff command in 
Stata (Bartus 2005). Average marginal effects and standard errors for marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. 
16 These findings give an indication what are the determinants of the use of specific combinations of financial services and can be 
used to add additional value to the discussion of the ordered probit results. The combinations are savings and credit, savings and 
insurance, credit and insurance, and all three financial services. In addition, we estimate separate probit regressions of the 
determining factors of the uptake of savings products, loans and insurance (see Table 8 in the Appendix). 14 
services, whereas the latter is statistically not significant. Further, such households are 
significantly less likely to use no financial service.  
Table 4: Ordered probit model on the uptake of financial services (I) 
No Service  One  Two  Three  Variable 
Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects 
Household’s self perception 
towards risk 
-0.0122*  0.0098* 0.0022* 0.0001 
Drought  0.0132  -0.0106 -0.0025 -0.0001 
Animal  threat  -0.005  0.0048 0.0010 0.00005 
Crop  Failure  0.0151  -0.0121 -0.0028 -0.0002 
Death  -0.0361***  0.0301*** 0.0058*** 0.0003** 
Illness  -0.0387***  0.0321*** 0.0063*** 0.0003** 
Input  -0.0183  0.0151 0.0031 0.0002 
No ability to sell agricultural 
products 
-0.0408*** 0.0342***  0.0063***  0.0003** 
Other  risk  -0.0069  0.0057 0.0012 0.00006 
Female  head  -0.0047  0.0038 0.0008 0.00004 
Household  size  -0.0044  0.0036 0.0008 0.0004* 
Age  -0.0056  0.0045 0.0010 0.00005 
Age  squared  0.00006  -0.00005 -0.00001 -0.0000005 
No or primary education  0.0049  -0.0040  -0.0009  -0.00005 
Secondary  Education  0.0008  -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0000008 
Head is selfemployed  0.0159  -0.0129  -0.0028  -0.0001 
Head is unemployed  0.0162  -0.0130  -0.0030  -0.0002 
Distance to road  0.0000009  -0.0000008  -0.0000002  -0.000000009 
Remittance  -0.0205  0.0168 0.0035 0.0002 
Land  ownership  -0.0598***  0.0483*** 0.0109*** 0.0006*** 
Asset  index  -0.0318***  0.0258*** 0.0058*** 0.0003** 
Observations 330 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Ordered probit model. Coefficients normalized to display marginal effects. The asterisks indicate level of significance 
(Robust z-statistics): ***significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
The separate regressions in Table 6 show as well a positive association with household’s 
participation in savings and loans, savings and insurance, loans and insurance, and all three of 
them. These findings indicate that the uptake of financial services increases with household’s self 
perception towards risk. There is evidence that households may not link financial service uptake 
with an additional risk, but may see them as measures to cope with the consequences of the risks 
they face. Household heads take as well combinations of different financial products into 
consideration due to their financial capability level, when choosing risk management strategies as 
a reaction of the incidence of a peril. The poor have a higher incentive to secure against the 
consequences of such hazards and thus, a higher probability to uptake any financial service. This 
is highly related to the access to financial services, which is often limited for the poor. The 
explanatory power of our results is constrained  due to the perceptive measurement of nature and 
degree of risk aversion 
The experience of specific hazards in the past determines the probability of the uptake for 
one, two or three financial services (Table 4). The same is true for the estimates for the 
combinations of financial services in the separate probit model (Table 6). Therefore, we limit our 
discussion to the statistically significant estimates here. We find that after the experience of the 
death of a household member households are significantly less likely to use no financial service, 15 
but more likely to use one, two or three financial services. In contrast to this outcome, we find 
that the probability to use savings products and credit decreases after the experience of a death in 
the household. The same outcome appears in the case of severe illness of a household member. 
After the occurrence of the inability to sell agricultural products in the past five years households 
have a lower probability to use no service, but a higher probability to use one, two or three 
financial services. There is no evidence for these three types of risks that an experience of such 
peril in the past has a negative impact on the household’s accessibility to financial services. 
Overall, it is demonstrated that households uses one or a more diversified pool of financial 
services as risk management strategies after the experience of certain shocks. The death and 
severe illness of a household member are both family related and idiosyncratic hazards, which 
can efficiently covered by respective financial services. It is important to note that such type of 
risks indicate rather low risk for the providing institutions. The inability to sell agricultural shocks 
can be an idiosyncratic, but as well an aggregate hazard. It depends highly on the reason for the 
inability to sell. After the experience of a crop failure or another shock in the past five years 
household’s accessibility to financial services and probability to use all three financial services 
decreases (Table 6). 
Beyond, other characteristics of the household’s decision for the use of financial services 
are included as control variables in the regression
17. In contrast to earlier contributions in the 
literature, we find that female headed households are more likely to use one, two, or three 
financial services compared to their male counterparts, whereas none of the findings is 
statistically significant. The same holds for the variable household size despite of the outcome for 
three financial services, which presents a significantly positive association. Further, there is 
evidence that the probability to uptake savings products and loans, savings products and 
insurance, loans and insurance, and all three financial products increases with rising household 
size (Table 6). This indicates that larger households are less likely to have no access to and to use 
no financial services due to higher incentives for the household heads for protection of the other 
household members and especially in our case due to the fact that larger households have more 











                                                 
17 We emphasize the factors with a statistically significant outcome. 16 
Table 5: Ordered probit model on the uptake of financial services (II) 
No Service  One  Two  Three  Variable 
Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects 
Household’s self perception 
towards risk 
-0.0288**  0.0196** 0.0084** 0.0009 
Drought  0.0434  -0.0286 -0.0132 -0.0016 
Animal  threat  -0.0052  0.0035 0.0015 0.0002 
Crop  Failure  0.0249  -0.0165 -0.0075 -0.0009 
Death -0.0823**  0.0591**  0.0213***  0.0019** 
Illness  -0.0927***  0.0663*** 0.0242*** 0.0023*** 
Input  -0.0441  0.0307 0.0121 0.0012 
No ability to sell agricultural 
products 
-0.1104*** 0.0810***  0.0271***  0.0023*** 
Other  risk  -0.0093  0.0063 0.0027 0.0003 
Female head  -0.0000003  -0.0000002  0.00000008  0.00000008 
Household  size  -0.0107  0.0073 0.0311 0.0003 
Age  -0.0109  0.0074 0.0032 0.0003 
Age  squared  0.0001  -0.00008 -0.00004 -0.0000004 
No or primary education  0.0156  -0.0105  -0.0046  -0.0005 
Secondary  Education  0.0059  -0.0041 -0.0017 -0.0002 
Head is selfemployed  0.0307  -0.0209  -0.0088  -0.0009 
Head is unemployed  0.0317  -0.0212  -0.0094  -0.0011 
Distance to road  0.00002  -0.00001  -0.0000005  -0.00000006 
Remittance  -0.0509  0.0357 0.0138 0.0013 
Land  ownership  -0.1248***  0.0823*** 0.0379*** 0.0041*** 
Quintile 1  0.1382***  -0.1155***  -0.0597**  -0.0081 
Quintile 2  0.1357**  -0.0875***  -0.0429*  -0.0054 
Quintile  3  0.0122  -0.0082 -0.0036 -0.0004 
Quintile  4  -0.0129  0.0088 0.0037 0.0004 
Observations 330 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Ordered probit model. Coefficients normalized to display marginal effects. The asterisks indicate level of significance 
(Robust z-statistics): ***significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
There is evidence for a life-cycle effect for one, two, and three financial services uptake, 
whereas none of the estimates is statistically significant (Table 4). Further, age is significantly 
positive related to the uptake of savings products and credit, but negative related to the uptake of 
savings products and insurance, insurance and credit, and all three financial services (Table 6). 
This indicates that with increasing age the household heads are less financial capable to use a 
more diversified set of financial services than their younger counterparts or are restricted from 
the access to them. Further, there appears to be a life-cycle effect for the usage of savings 
products and credit. Household heads with no formal, primary or secondary education are 
significantly more likely to use no financial services or respectively are excluded from the uptake 
of financial services than their better educated counterparts, whereas the marginal effects are not 
statistically significant. Remarkably, we find that household heads with no formal, primary or 
secondary education are significantly less likely to use a combination of savings products and 
credit (Table 6). Household’s heads lower educational attainment limit their abilities to 
understand and apply for such services (i.e. a lower financial capability), their perception as 
possible risk management strategies and as well increase mistrust and risk perception according to 
the participation in microfinance services and institutions. Further, they might be excluded due to 
lower income earning abilities and a respective lower socioeconomic status. 17 
The same outcome for the estimates of the ordered probit regression is true for the self-
employed or unemployed heads. The estimates for the distance to road variable as an financial 
market access indicator show that households with an increasing distance to the market are more 
likely to be excluded from the use of financial services, but none of the findings are statistically 
significant. Remittances increase significantly household’s accessibility to financial services and 
the likelihood to use one, two or more financial services, but none of the estimates is statistically 
significant. We expect that the household’s socioeconomic status is highly related to the 
participation in financial services in Sri Lanka. There is evidence that households who own any 
land are significantly less likely to use no financial services and more likely to use one, two, and 
three financial services.  
Households with a higher asset endowment are significantly more likely to use one, two 
or three financial services (Table 4). Poorer households are more likely to be excluded from the 
use of financial services than better off households. In Table 6, there is evidence that the poor 
have a lower accessibility to use specific combinations of the three financial services. In line with 
the literature, this indicates that microfinancial services are so far not able to target the poorest 
households in Sri Lanka adequately or rather the poorest have no or only limited access to such 
financial services (Hulme and Mosley 1997, Navajas et al. 2002, Datta 2004). In Table 5, we 
investigate five asset quintiles indicating household’s relative wealth status rank in terms of asset 
endowment to analyze the accessibility to finance for the households in Sri Lank. Households in 
the two poorest quintiles (Quintile 1 and 2) are significantly more likely to be excluded from the 
use of financial services, but less likely to use one, two or three financial services compared to the 
households in the fifth quintile. Households in the third quintile are more likely to have no 
financial services and less likely to use any financial services and households in the fourth quintile 
are less likely to use no and more likely to uptake one, two or three financial services, whereas 
none of these outcomes are statistically significant. We confirm that the accessibility to finance is 
restricted for the poorest in Sri Lanka. Exclusion can appear voluntarily and involuntarily. 
However, it is unlikely that the poor choose not to use financial services. Yet, it is probable that 
they do not use financial services due to religious or cultural reasons or to lower financial 












Table 6: Probit models on the uptake of financial services 







Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects 
Household’s self perception 
towards risk 
0.0903** 0.0012**  0.0021***  0.0008** 
Drought  0.2415  -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0003 
Animal threat  -0.0008  0.0003  -0.0013  0.0005 
Crop Failure  0.7625***  -0.0012**  -0.0021  -0.0010** 
Death  -0.0392***  0.0475 0.0623 0.0101 
Illness  0.0028  0.0016 0.0028 0.0028 
Input -0.1848***  -0.0009  -0.0026*  -0.0003 
No ability to sell agricultural 
products 
0.4044 0.0206  0.0313  0.0118 
Other risk  0.3482*  -0.0015**  -0.0036***  -0.011** 
Female  head  0.1385  0.0009 0.0040 0.0013 
Household size  0.0262*  0.0011*  0.0035***  0.0008* 
Age 0.033**  -0.0009**  -0.0014*  -0.0005* 
Age squared  -0.0003**  0.0000008**  0.00001  0.0000005* 
No or primary education  -0.0639***  0.0270  0.0626  0.0178 
Secondary  Education  -0.1077**  0.0031 0.0049 0.0024 
Head is selfemployed  -0.2895**  -0.0003  0.0019  0.0002 
Head is unemployed  -0.0760**  -0.0014  0.0008  -0.0009 
Distance to road  0.0001**  0.00000006  0.00000005  0.00000004 
Remittance  0.1025  0.0023 0.0161 0.0043 
Land ownership  0.1353***  0.0014  0.0028*  0.0013* 
Asset  index  0.0621***  0.0045*** 0.0087*** 0.0033*** 
Observations  133  152 168 108 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Ordered probit model. Coefficients normalized to display marginal effects. The asterisks indicate level of significance 
(Robust z-statistics): ***significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
Importantly, they might be as well excluded from the use of financial services due to 
specific requirements of the providers such as too high prices or non-price barriers, contractual 
or informational framework, discrimination against certain population groups or that they are 
considered to be unbankable because of lacking or irregular income or too high risk (World Bank 
2008). Another reason may be that the poor missing a basic level of financial capability or 
anybody who understands the services who are available for them, and who is able to fill the 
respective application forms (World Bank 2008). 
6 Conclusion   
Microfinancial services are promising measures to serve low-income households with 
different options to use such financial services as risk management or risk mitigation strategies in 
the case of the experience of severe hazards. They can be both used before or after the incidence 
of  such peril. Important to note is that especially the more diversified participation, i.e. the use 
of different types of financial services, hold the promise to adequately address the financial needs 
of the households related to the consequences of certain risks. In this paper, we investigate the 
determinants for the three different types of financial services by estimating an ordered probit 
models to analyze the determinants, which affect the household’s decision to use no, only one, 
two or all three different. The estimation procedure allows the following suggestions if 19 
households identify financial services as possible risk management strategies, whether a past 
shock experience of a household have an impact on the use of financial services in respect to 
quantitative and qualitative reasons, and which role such services can play in terms of risk 
mitigation in Sri Lanka. Thereby, we interpret the estimations result concerning the usage of 
financial services, i.e. the  demand side  and the supply side, i.e. the access to financial services, in 
Sri Lanka. 
First, we confirm that the probability to uptake financial services increases with rising 
household’s self perception towards risk. This is true for one, two or three financial services and 
as well for the specific combinations of the financial products. There is evidence that households 
may not link financial service uptake with an additional risk, but may see them as diversified 
measures to cope with the consequences of the risks they face. Combinations of different 
financial products may play as well a key role as possible, interconnected risk management 
strategies after the incidence of a shock. The poor have a higher incentive to secure against the 
consequences of such hazards, but the access to financial services is often limited for them. 
Therefore, a more developed financial and especially microfinance market in line with a higher 
geographical outreach and diversity would be necessary to overcome these constraints. Policy 
makers can set the right legal frameworks and especially incentives for this.  
Second, we find that the outcome of the eight dummy variables representing the 
households’ risk exposure in the past five years gives a manifold picture. The accessibility to and 
the probability of the uptake for one, two or three financial services is determined by the 
experience of specific hazards in the past. After the experience of the death of a household 
member households, a severe illness of a household member or an inability to sell agricultural 
products households in the past five years are significantly more likely to use one, two or three 
financial services. The death and severe illness of a household member are both family related 
and idiosyncratic hazards, which can efficiently covered by respective financial services. 
Remarkably, there is clear evidence that financial services may or are seen as achievable and 
efficient risk management strategies to mitigate the consequences of an experienced shock or to 
prevent for possible losses of such hazards in Sri Lanka. 
Beyond, we highlight some different and new implications from our estimations for Sri 
Lanka to add some more value to the discussion on the uptake of financial services in developing 
countries. First, larger households are less likely to have no access to and more likely to use 
financial services due to higher incentives for the household heads for protection of the other 
household members and especially in our case due to the fact that larger households have more 
economically active adult household members in Sri Lanka. Second,  there is a life-cycle effect for 
the combination of savings products and credit. Third, household heads with no formal, primary 20 
or secondary education are significantly more likely to be excluded from the uptake of the 
combination of savings and credit, which indicates a lack of a basic level of financial capability 
among them. Fourth, the same outcome appears for savings products and credit for the self-
employed or unemployed heads. Finally, better off households are more likely to use financial 
services than their poorer counterparts in Sri Lanka. Microfinancial services are so far not able to 
reach the poorest or the accessibility to finance is still limited for the poorest in Sri Lanka. It is 
unlikely that the poor choose voluntarily not to use financial services due to the high risk 
exposure they face in the past and in the future. Among the poor, there are some households 
who neglect to use financial services due to religious or cultural reasons, but the majority of the 
poor is excluded from finance because of supply-side constraints and their poor understanding of 
financial markets and products. It is necessary to improve and broaden the access to finance for 
the poor and to raise the knowledge among low-educated, illiterate and certain religious groups to 
increase the awareness about the benefits of financial services as adequate and efficient risk 
management strategies in Sri Lanka. Policy makers have not only to force the development of a 
better access to finance for the poor, but as well the promotion of household’s financial 
capability levels through increasing the public awareness and implementing financial educational 
campaigns. From the microfinance sector in Sri Lanka, simple and easily understandable products 
and the promotion of financial education as well are demanded to empower the poor to use 
microfinancial services as a diversified set to manage the consequences of risks they are faced by.  
 21 
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Appendix 





Household’s assessment of risk own risk situation (subjective exposure to health shocks, road or 
work accidents, and economic shocks compared with neighbours, own rating of willingness to take 
risks), index created by factor analysis 
Drought  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a drought in the last five years and this shock had 
serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Animal threat  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a animal threat in the last five years and this shock 
had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Crop failure  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a crop failure in the last five years and this shock had 
serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Death  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the death of a household member in the last five years 
and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 
otherwise  
Illness  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the illness of a household member in the last five 
years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to 
recover, 0 otherwise  
Input  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced an increase of input prices in the last five years and 
this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 
otherwise 
No ability to sell 
agricultural products 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the shock that the household was not able to sell 
agricultural products in the last five years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household 
needed more than one month to recover, 0 otherwise 
Other shock  Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a severe shock other than the previous described 
shock in the last five years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more 
than one month to recover, 0 otherwise  
Household size  Household size 
Age  Age of the household head 
Age squared  Age of the household head squared 
No or primary 
education 
Dummy variable, 1 if household has no or only primary education, 0 otherwise 
Secondary education  Dummy variable, 1 if household has secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Self employed  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is self-employed or contractual worker in either agriculture or 
non-agricultural activities, 0 otherwise 
Not employed  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is not employed due to young or old age, disability, or similar 
reasons, 0 otherwise  
Head is farmer  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is engaged in any farm activities, 0 otherswise 
Distance to road  Distance to nearest access road in meter 
Remittances  Dummy variable, 1 if household receives remittances from former household members who have 
migrated, 0 otherwise 
Land  Dummy variable, if the household owns any land, 0 otherwise 
Assets Assets  index 
Quintiles 1 - 5  Five asset index quintiles labeled as Quintile 1 to 5, Quintile 1 is the poorest quintile and Quintile 5 
is the quintile of households with the highest asset endowment. 
Dummy variables, 1 if household belong to the asset index quintile, 0 otherwise. (Quintile 5 
functions as reference category) 
















Table 8: Outcome of separate probit models for the use of financial services 
Use of Savings  Use of Loans  Use of insurance   Variable 
Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects 
Household’s self perception 
towards risk 
0.323*** 0.614***  0.003*** 
Drought -0.773***  0.107  -0.001 
Animal threat  0.518***  0.151  -0.001 
Crop Failure  0.190  0.722***  -0.003** 
Death 0.409***  -0.360***  0.217 
Illness 0.451***  -0.232  0.0001 
Input -0.946***  -0.404***  -0.003* 
No ability to sell agricultural 
products 
0.414*** 0.702***  0.019 
Other risk  0.104  0.763***  -0.004*** 
Female head  0.278  0.881***  0.009 
Household size  -0.106  0.147***  0.004*** 
Age 0.131  0.214***  -0.002*** 
Age squared  -0.002*  -0.002***  0.00002** 
No or primary education  -0.821***  -0.492***  0.123 
Secondary Education  -0.725***  -0.239*  0.009* 
Head is selfemployed  0.392  -0.970***  0.002 
Head is unemployed  0.627***  -0.649***  0.0003 
Distance to road  -0.0004  0.0008***  0.000002 
Remittance -0.639***  0.569**  0.048 
Land ownership  0.947***  0.392***  0.003 
Asset index  0.221  0.309***  0.012*** 
Observations 330 330  330 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Probit models. Coefficients normalized to display marginal effects. The asterisks indicate level of significance (Robust z-
statistics): ***significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 27 





















Distance Remittance Land Assets 
Risk 
assessment 
1.00                                    
Drought  -0.03  1.00                                  
Animal  Threat  0.05  0.47  1.00                                 
Crop  Failure  0.06  0.14  0.17  1.00                               
Death  0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.05  1.00                               
Illness  0.09  -0.02  -0.03  0.08  -0.0  1.00                            
Input  -0.01  0.22  0.23  0.19  -0.04  -0.01  1.00                          
Agricultural 
products 
-0.03  0.49  0.28  0.21  -0.04  0.01  0.33  1.00                        
Other shock  0.01  -0.12  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.13  -0.15  -0.09  1.00                      
Female  head  -0.01  0.06  0.10 0.02  0.18 -0.09  0.06  -0.01  0.04  1.00                      
Household 
size 
0.04 -0.04  -0.05  0.11  0.01  0.13  0.04  0.06  0.10  -0.25  1.00                  
Age 0.15  -0.02  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.10  0.03  -0.01  -0.08  0.17  0.0975  1.00                
Age squared  0.17  -0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.11  0.03  -0.02  -0.07  0.16  0.08  0.98  1.00              
No or primary  0.17 0.01 0.02  0.07  0.07  0.07  -0.01  0.06 0.02  0.13  0.15  0.36  0.37  1.00            
SSSecondary -0.08  0.00  -0.00  0.02  -0.07  0.07  0.02  0.03  -0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.40  1.00          
Self employed  -0.03  0.19  0.11  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.15 0.02  -0.04 0.05 -0.11  -0.13 0.04  0.04 1.00           
Not employed  0.09  -0.13  -0.05  -0.01  0.02  0.05  -0.01  -0.08 0.05  0.19  -0.01 0.34  0.37 0.17 -0.03  -0.65  1.00        
Distance -0.02  -0.04  -0.09  -0.09  0.05 -0.05  -0.09  -0.01  -0.00 -0.03  -0.16  -0.13  -0.12  0.01 -0.08  0.17  -0.10  1.00       
Remittance -0.06  -0.00  0.13  0.09  -0.01  0.02  0.10  -0.02  -0.03  0.22 -0.03  0.18  0.19  0.17 -0.08 -0.03  0.11 -0.04  1.00     
Land 0.03  0.19  0.08  0.13  0.07  -0.03  0.16 0.16  0.06  0.03 0.08 0.06  0.06  0.04 -0.15  -0.05 0.028 -0.30  0.02  1.00  
Assets -0.12  -0.18  -0.14  0.14  -0.03  -0.03  0.08  -0.01  -0.01  -0.11  0.11  -0.03  -0.03  -0.19  -0.11  -0.11 -0.03 -0.14  0.02  0.07 1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation.    
 